Railway Industry Regulation
Background - Rail & Health Regulation
There are many parallels between the provision of rail and health services in the UK. Most obviously, we now have government-run railway operated by the private sector in the form of franchised Train Operating Companies. And we have a government-run health service, again substantially provided by the private sector in the form of self-employed GPs, dentists etc, plus hospitals with a great degree of independence which compete with each other and can and do go out of business. Both sectors are subject to competition law which can lead to the competition authorities making decisions which conflict with government policy - for instance to grant rail franchises or to merge hospitals. The following notes explain why it is extraordinarily difficult to regulate these two sectors.
On the one hand, they both contain near-monopolies. The rail industry contains a number of natural or near natural monopolies, for there can usually be only one set of tracks between stations. The health service is (quite rightly) staffed by restricted-entry professionals, and specialist services need to be provided in a small number of regional centres. And most of us are reluctant and/or unable to change general practitioners (GPs). As a result, both sectors demonstrate lower than optimal productivity, and the quality of their service provision is often the subject of serious criticism. It is also the case that they are both heavily taxpayer funded. Successive governments have therefore been very keen to find ways of introducing competition into the sectors, so as to drive greater efficiency and improved service quality, and reduce the size of the taxpayer subsidy.
However, even putting their monopolistic characteristics on one side, it is clearly impossible to abolish all subsidies and introduce unrestricted competition into either sector. This would inevitably price-out poorer members of the community, imposing unacceptable social cost and - in the case of the rail system - doing huge economic damage to the economy of Greater London which depends so heavily on the rush hour commuter rail network. After all, any new transport infrastructure brings with it very large externalities (i.e. costs and benefits which accrue to third parties). In the case of rail, these are mainly beneficial, allowing new housing and commercial development, and increasing land prices. That is why it makes sense for the government to build roads and railways, and then subsidise their running costs, recouping the cost through general taxation.
There is also the point that effective regulation in any sector has to ensure that price competition does not leak through into unacceptably reduced service quality and/or a reduced range of services. But this is extremely hard to do in these sectors, for what is 'unacceptable'? In rail, where is the balance to be struck? It is extremely difficult (and probably impossible) to ascertain the extent to which rail passengers would be willing to trade reduced quality and reduced service frequency for lower fares. And then what about the rail safety/cost trade off? In health, it is surely near-impossible to measure 'quality', let alone ascertain what trade-offs would be acceptable.
Rail - Comment
Before rail privatisation in 1993, all the trade-offs and compromises were resolved within and between state-owned British Rail and the government of the day, without too much reference to passengers. Privatisation then created c.100 companies where there had previously been only British Rail. Trade-offs etc are therefore now resolved through complex interactions between the Government represented by the Department for Transport (DfT), a semi-independent but still public sector Network Rail, the Office of Rail and Road (ORR - previously the Office of Rail Regulation), the private sector rolling stock owning companies (ROSCOs) who lease rolling stock to the (mainly) private sector train operating companies (TOCs).
Most of the TOCs are franchisees - that is they have successfully bid for franchises to operate as monopolies or near-monopolies running trains along a particular set railway lines. A small number of TOCs compete with the franchisees as open access operators.
The main benefit of privatisation is that the policies of the TOCs are strongly informed by what customers want. And passenger numbers have soared since privatisation - see chart on the right. There are currently 1,700 million train journeys made each year compared with 800 million journeys made around 20 years ago. It is far from clear, though, how much privatisation and good regulation have contributed to this. Passenger growth in recent years has been strongly correlated with employment. There are some key facts towards the end of this note.
Certainly no-one suggests that the ownership and regulatory structure is in any sense ideal, and it has changed a lot over the years as successive governments have grappled with the tensions inherent in the system, without wanting to undertake the embarrassing and/or expensive task of renationalising the system. Above all, privatisation has certainly failed to deliver the reductions in subsidies that were envisaged by its supporters.
It should also be clearly understood that franchising offers competition only at the time of bidding for franchises - i.e. every few years - and that the cost of bidding has increasingly led to there even being relatively little competition for individual franchises. There is also a somewhat unresolved issue about the amount of risk that should be borne by the franchisees. They cannot for instance manage the (substantial) impact of the economy on passenger numbers so they argue this risk should in principle be held by (a rather reluctant) government. But most other private sector companies obviously have to manage similar risk themselves, and can accordingly fall into liquidation. Taking a similar approach at franchise time would clearly significantly reduce the amount that a successful franchisee would be willing to pay for the franchise.
Michael Moran published a critical review of rail privatisation in 2017.
Here are a few - necessarily brief - notes on recent and current regulatory issues.
Open Access This was supposed to be the big gain following privatisation - true competition along the main railway lines with successful franchisees being kept on their toes by small niche operators offering cheaper (maybe slower) services and/or services to less popular destinations and/or better service, such as dining cars. They wouldn't pay their 'fair share' of the infrastructure cost - only the marginal cost of adding additional trains - but they are not allowed to be 'revenue extracting' - i.e. they are supposed to attract additional passengers, not steal them from the franchisee.
This latter condition was initially interpreted quite restrictively by government and ORR who together ensured that nothing was to be allowed to come between the franchisees and their monopoly profits, which led in turn to big payments to the government. Very few operators have accordingly been allowed open access. But ORR seem recently to have become rather more keen on open access, much to the irritation of the Department for Transport. This is in part an Arup report in 2009 showd that, where passengers have a choice of operator, fares were kept down and service frequency and other quality measure improved. The current situation is as follows:
- Heathrow Express is one open access operator - but a very special one.
- A service from Shrewsbury to London was subject to so many restrictions that it never attracted sufficient passengers.
- And in December 2014 ORR rejected an application by Great North Western Railway to run an off peak service between London Euston and Blackpool, Huddersfield and Leeds.
- So there are currently only two true open access operators, both running up the East Coast from London - to Bradford and Sunderland (Grand Central) and Hull (Hull Trains). They together carry c.20% of east coast passengers. Grand Central is owned by Arriva which is in turn owned by Deutsche Bahn. Hull Trains is owned by First Group.
- But ORR issued a licence to First Group in May 2016 to run five trains a day, each way, between London and Edinburgh, on condition that there is no first class accommodation and that the average single fare is £25. The new services will not start until 2021.
- Overall, however, open access accounts for only c.1% of all passenger journeys.
- Great North Western Railway has been given permission to launch open access passenger services between London and Blackpool in early 2018.
There are frequent complaints about the complexity of fare structures - the result of franchisees:
- introducing targeted incentives aimed at attracting customers from other franchises and from competing transport operators such as coaches and airlines, and
- offering targeted fare reductions aimed at those who who are willing to travel in less comfort and/or on less popular trains and/or book in advance.
The resultant complexity is unpopular, not least with occasional travelers, but the low fares certainly appeal to students, families, the retired and many others who happily trade speed and flexibility for the some remarkable cost-savings. As of October 2016, the lowest advance fare from London to Newcastle was £26.40 with a railcard. The highest walk-on first class fare was £222.00.
The equivalent London Paddington-Bristol Temple Meads fares were £19.90 and £174.50, and there was a £7.90 fare available on a through train from Waterloo.
It is of course a fundamental feature of competition that it drives down prices and drives up quality on average. But it carries no guarantees about which particular customers or providers may win and lose from the process, and the losers can be very vociferous.
CMA Review The Competition and Markets Authority (CMA) has carried out a policy project (not a formal investigation) into the scope for greater rail competition for passengers. Its report was published in March 2016 and called for the government to encourage competition by increasing the number of open access services (see above) or by splitting up franchises. In the longer term, the CMA recommended the more radical option of scrapping the franchise system in favour of licensing multiple operators on the main intercity routes.
The CMA has from time to time carried out investigations into the letting of new franchises when they threaten to reduce competition on short stretches of lines. There has been a recent investigation, for instance, into the provision of rail services between Peterborough and Grantham and Lincoln as a Stagecoach dominated franchise were allowed take over the East Coast Main Line, even though Stagecoach already ran the only other rail services between those cities. This seemed a bit of a sledgehammer to crack a small nut - especially as much of the rest of the network (and much of the rest of the East Coast Main Line) already had no competition whatsoever - but the issue obviously mattered a lot to a number of passengers, and the CMA have a pretty good track record in handling these small investigations sensibly and efficiently.
Some railway fares are subject to price control. Follow this link for an introduction to price controls and a brief mention of a 2014 Government interference in the process which led to higher fares for some, and reductions for others.
ORR published a number of reports in and around 2015 which were hugely critical of Network Rail's performance, citing frequent project delays and cost over-runs, including one of 113%. The construction projects were also criticised by passengers and the media for being too disruptive to existing services. The Government, too, expressed severe concerns, and temporarily suspended work on the upgrades of two of the UK's most congested lines. Partly as a result, Dame Colette Bowe has led a review which recommended that ORR should have a greater role the planning of Network Rail's major infrastructure projects. DfT are considering how to respond to this suggestion.
Nicola Shaw has reviewed the future shape and financing of Network Rail. She recommended in March 2016 that NR should:
- cease regarding the train operators as its principal customers and instead focus on the needs of passengers
- demolish its top-down, centrally-driven structure and devolve more autonomy to those more in touch with local rail networks (with each 'route' being regulated by a newly-empowered ORR)
- focus on meeting the challenges of continued rapid growth in use of the network, including
- improve connections between major Northern cities rather than continue to prioritise their connections to London.
She also recommended that the Government should develop and maintain a long-term vision for the industry. (Don't hold your breath!)
DfT have not yet responded to these recommendations.
DfT frequently complain about ROSCO profits which are achieved, they feel, as a result of over-charging the TOCs who lease the (sometimes very old) trains from the ROSCOs and then pass on the cost to the Government (through reduced franchise payments) or to passengers through fares. The Competition Commission (the CC - the CMA's predecessor) looked at this leasing market and reported in 2009. The CC pointed out that the ROSCOs' profits could not have been foreseen when they were created and that the solution was now in DfT's hands. They could, for instance, lengthen the franchise lengths and so encourage both the ROSCOs and the franchisees to invest in new rolling stock. DfT have not yet taken this option.
HS2 (High Speed 2) is a new high speed railway line that is to be built between London and Birmingham and then on to Manchester, Sheffield and Leeds. It is a controversial and very expensive (£50 billion) project that cannot be justified on pure economic grounds but is a leap of faith by national politicians - but that has been true of so many large infrastructure projects. (HS1 connects London St Pancras International with North Kent and the Channel Tunnel.)
Some argue that the UK railway industry is now too obsessed with passenger safety and this leads to excessive costs, including when planning new infrastructure. Passengers are, however, no doubt relieved that there have been no fatal passenger accidents since 2007.
Performance problems in 2016/17, mainly driven by industrial action over the introduction of guard-free trains, led to media and political pressure to take the railways back into private ownership. Given the current strength of the respective political parties, this was unlikely to happen any time soon, but it was entertaining to see the Shadow Chancellor blame the private sector when a problem with state-owned infrastructure led to his missing an appearance on BBC Question Time - see Twitter exchange on the left.
This 2015 blog by Dieter Helm is an excellent review of railway industry performance, and what might be done about it.
Rail: Key facts:
- Privatisation and competition have between them undoubtedly encouraged many customer-focussed improvements in the industry, improvements which could in theory have been achieved under state ownership, though probably not in practice, if only because of insufficient investment by cash-strapped governments. But they do not seem to have reduced the net cost to the government. Total subsidy in 1988-9 was £446m, or £870m in 2014 prices, compared with £3,800 million in 2014-15.
- Passenger kilometres rose from 34.3 billion to 62.9 billion, so ...
- ... the subsidy rose, in real terms, from 2.5p to 6p per passenger km.
- Total government subsidy for the rail industry was £2,233m in 2012-13.
- Within this figure, train operators actually paid the government £0.03 per passenger mile, compared with receiving £0.002 ppm in 2009-10. The balance, around £0.098 ppm was a large payment to the infrastructure operator, Network Rail.
- There were 1,650 million passenger journeys in 2014 compared with 800 million twenty years earlier.
- There were 47 daily services from Manchester to London (and 47 in the other direction) in 2014, compared with 17 twenty years earlier.